In this book, I make use of an idea from economics to suggest how noble human tendencies might not only have survived the ruthless pressures of the material world, but actually have been nurtured by them.

Historically, leadership positions, as well as research on leadership and effective leadership, was primarily reserved for men or masculine characteristics With most societies traditionally following a patriarchal hierarchy, few people questioned inequalities in leadership attainment, largely because of supernatural and/or natural explanations of men’s natural ability and desire to lead. This book runs counter to that culture and examines the experiences and leadership enactments of ten historically famous women leaders in hopes of gaining insight into their uniquely female leadership styles.

In a recent article appearing in this journal, Theresa Scavenius compellingly argues that the traditional “rational-individualistic” conception of responsibility is ill-suited to accounting for the sense in which moral agents share in responsibility for both contributing to the causes and, proactively, working towards solutions for climate change. Lacking an effective moral framework through which to make sense of individual moral responsibility for climate change, many who have good intentions and the means to contribute to solutions for climate change tend to (...) dismiss or put off addressing the root causes. With this tendency arises the practical problem that climate change calls for urgent global collective action, both in terms of mitigation and adaptation, in order to prevent global temperature rise from exceeding 2C and avoid worst case climate scenarios. In this paper, I develop a phenomenological theory of ecological responsibility which addresses the conceptual problem Scavenius brings out and contributes to clarifying the sense in which moral agents share responsibility for both the causes and solutions for climate change. To develop this theory, I draw from, combine, and transform insights from the late work of Husserl on open horizons, transcendental intersubjectivity, and genetic phenomenology with breakthroughs from Emmanuel Levinas in articulating an original, asymmetrical theory of unlimited, diachronic responsibility. In drawing from Husserl, I show how what Levinas describes as the source of a demand for unlimited, diachronic responsibility can be phenomenologically reinterpreted in terms of a horizon of indeterminacy. I then show how horizons of indeterminacy arise in phenomenological descriptions of both human and nonhuman entities in such a way that discloses the demand for responsibility as a broad-ranging demand for unlimited, diachronic ecological responsibility. An important implication of this phenomenological theory of ecological responsibility is that it contributes to clarifying the sense in which individual moral agents share in responsibility for long range collective moral problems such as climate change. (shrink)

Many developing and transitional countries have grown faster than advanced countries in the past decade, resulting in a shift in the distribution of world income in their favor. China is now the second largest economy in the world, behind the United States and ahead of Japan. As the relative economic weight of China and several others has come to match or exceed that of the middle-ranking G7 economies, the world economy has shifted from “unipolar” toward “multipolar,” less dominated by the (...) G7. How is this change being translated into changes in authority and influence within multilateral organizations like the G20, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund? Alarm bells are ringing in G7 capitals about G7 loss of influence. According to a WikiLeaks cable from the senior U.S. official for the G20 process, from January 2010, “It is remarkable how closely coordinated the BASIC group of countries [Brazil, South Africa, India, China] have become in international fora, taking turns to impede US/eu initiatives and playing the US and EU off against each other.” This essay suggests that the shift in power is much smaller than the headlines or private alarm bells suggest. The United States remains the dominant state, and the G7 states together continue to exercise primacy, but now more fearfully and defensively. China is split between asserting itself as “the wave of the future” and defending itself as too poor to take on global responsibilities. The combination of G7 defensiveness and emerging states’ jealous guarding of sovereignty produces a spirit of Westphalian assertion in international fora, or “every state for itself.” On the assumption that the world economy is in a transitional period, the article suggests reforms in the G20 and the World Bank that would boost their role and legitimacy as multilateral organizations in a more multipolar world. (shrink)

Robert Myers presents an original moral theory which charts a course between the extremes of consequentialism and contractualism, portraying morality not simply as a matter of promoting the overall good but rather as a matter of cooperating in its promotion. This gives him answers to two of the most vexing questions in moral philosophy: how can increasing general welfare and respecting individual rights be equally fundamental features of moral activity, and what gives morality's demands their special character of inescapability?

This book profiles the leadership behavior of ten proven leaders from many walks of life whose leadership style included a highly developed sense of humor. The idea, of course, would be to look at the overall leadership behavior of these individuals, but focus especially on their symbolic frame leadership behavior in the form of humor, to determine how their behavior can inform our own particular leadership style.

RÉSUMÉEn réponse à Paul Hurley, je soutiens que l'argument de la triangulation de Donald Davidson ne peut s'appliquer aux croyances normatives que si ces croyances correspondent à des propriétés à la fois normatives et causales. L'argument engage donc Davidson à une forme de naturalisme non-réductif et étonnamment non-révisionniste. En réponse à Kirk Ludwig, je soutiens que Davidson avait de bonnes raisons d'abandonner les théories humiennes des pro-attitudes, parce qu'il avait de bonnes raisons d'accepter la forme de naturalisme non-réductive et non-révisionniste (...) qui émerge une fois que l'argument de la triangulation est appliqué aux croyances normatives. (shrink)

Rapid advances in cognitive neuroscience and converging technologies have led to a vigorous debate over cognitive enhancement. This book outlines the ethical and social issues, but goes on to focus on the policy dimensions, which until now have received much less attention. As the economic, social and personal stakes involved with cognitive enhancement are so high, and the advances in knowledge so swift, we are likely to see increasing demands for government involvement in cognitive enhancement techniques. The book therefore places (...) these techniques in a political context and brings the subsequent considerations and divisions to the forefront of the debate, situating their resolution within the milieu of interest group politics. The book will provide a starting point from which readers can develop a balanced policy framework for addressing such concerns. (shrink)

This volume focuses on issues involving the inviolability of the human body and the decision to end life. The contributors explore the difficulties in framing a public policy that legalizes aid in dying, and return to the more general question of what is the most fair and effective relationship between private medical authority and public policy.

Mr. Bork discusses concern over press power and irresponsibility, particularly the attitude of the press that the public's "right to know" gives them the right to publish anything. He expresses concern that the public backlash could lead to excessive restrictions on the press.

Leist worries that by tying the ideal of cooperation to the aim of promoting the good I exhibit a bias towards consequentialism, and that this in turn leads me to downsize the role to be played by the ideal of cooperation within moral theory. I maintain that no bias is exhibited towards consequentialism but acknowledge that realism is being favoured over constructivism. I further argue that the role assigned to the ideal of cooperation is as large as realism permits.